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1. #TRICKBOT STRIKES BACK INSTALL#
2. #TRICKBOT STRIKES BACK PASSWORD#
3. #TRICKBOT STRIKES BACK DOWNLOAD#
4. #TRICKBOT STRIKES BACK WINDOWS#

The threat actors then reran many of the same discovery techniques that were previously executed on the beachhead, including AdFind and BloodHound. This is a technique that we don’t see very often, but effective nevertheless.

#TRICKBOT STRIKES BACK PASSWORD#

Once they had domain controller access, ntdsutil was used to take a snapshot of “ntds.dit”, saved under “C:\Perflogs\1”, for offline password hash extraction.

#TRICKBOT STRIKES BACK WINDOWS#

Windows Defender real-time monitoring was then disabled, the LSASS.exe process was dumped using SysInternals ProcDump, and privilege was escalated to “SYSTEM” using named pipe impersonation.Īlmost four hours after initial execution, the threat actors pivoted to a domain controller using domain admin credentials and executed a Cobalt Strike Beacon. Even though the execution was not successful, the threat actors kept trying, a total of eight times, until it finally worked. Ten minutes after lateral movement, a PowerShell Cobalt Strike loader executed as a service on a server. It is unclear if this was an untrained actor, or there was a configuration issue.įifteen minutes after domain enumeration, we observed successful lateral movement to two endpoints on the network. One example being with a Beacon unsuccessfully injecting into a process. We observed the threat actors having technical issues. Presence was then expanded on the beachhead by using a PowerShell loader to execute additional Beacons. Once access through Cobalt Strike was established, the threat actors immediately proceeded with domain enumeration via Nltest, AdFind, BloodHound, and PowerSploit. The initial access method for that case was IcedID, which shows that the threat actors utilize various initial access methods to get into environments and accomplish their goals. One of the Cobalt Strike Beacons was the same payload and command and control infrastructure as used in a prior case. To guarantee execution on the beachhead host, multiple payloads were used. As part of further automated tasking, Trickbot performed an initial reconnaissance of the environment using native Windows tools such as nltest.exe and net.exe.įirst hands-on activity was observed two hours after initial compromise, when Trickbot downloaded and executed Cobalt Strike Beacons. Trickbot was automatically tasked to inject into the wermgr.exe process and use its well-known “pwgrab” module to steal browser credentials.

#TRICKBOT STRIKES BACK DOWNLOAD#

Certutil was used to download and load the Trickbot DLL into memory. Upon execution, certutil.exe was copied to %programdata% and renamed with random alphanumeric characters. The Trickbot payload came from a phishing campaign associated with BazarCall, delivering weaponized XLSB files. We have observed the same techniques in other intrusions and understanding these techniques will allow defenders to disrupt such intrusion activity and deny it in their own networks. Even though most of the techniques aren’t new or advanced, they have proven to be effective. The Conti operators chose to wait a couple days before ransoming the environment. The threat actors were able to go from initial access to the deployment of Conti ransomware in a matter of hours. In this intrusion, we observed a number of interesting techniques being leveraged by the threat actors. Unfamiliar with BazaCall/BazarCall? Read more here from & and here from & Summary A couple days later, the threat actors came back and executed Conti ransomware across the domain. From there the threat actor discovered the internal network before moving laterally to a domain controller for additional discovery.

#TRICKBOT STRIKES BACK INSTALL#

The threat actors used BazarCall to install Trickbot in the environment which downloaded and executed a Cobalt Strike Beacon. This report will go through an intrusion that went from an Excel file to domain wide ransomware.